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Abstract. As security protocols are used to authenticate more trans-
actions, they end up being relied on in legal proceedings. Designers of-
ten fail to anticipate this. Here we show how the EMV protocol – the
dominant card payment system worldwide – does not produce adequate
evidence for resolving disputes. We propose five principles for designing
systems to produce robust evidence. We apply these to other systems
such as Bitcoin, electronic banking and phone payment apps. We finally
propose specific modifications to EMV that could allow disputes to be
resolved more efficiently and fairly.
1 Introduction
Even if a security protocol design is sound, the implementation may be flawed;
principals may be dishonest; or other principals may raise doubt about the in-
tegrity of humans or system components. Such issues frequently occur with fi-
nancial transaction protocols, where real money is at stake.
In this paper, we use payment cards as a case study for developing principles
for designing systems to produce robust evidence of their correct operation.
These principles apply widely, but banking is a good place to start. Section 2
will summarize the EMV protocol and highlight its flaws from some case studies
of disputes; Section 3 will introduce a set of principles for designing systems to
produce reliable evidence; Section 4 will discuss some other systems and Section 5
will show how these principles can be applied to payment systems.
2 The EMV protocol and its flaws
The EMV protocol [11] promoted by EuroPay, MasterCard and Visa is now
the world’s dominant smart card payment system, with 1.55 billion cards (both
credit and debit) in issue as of Q2 2012 [10]. The USA is a late adopter but has
a target of 2015 for completing deployment [15].
EMV provides a standard toolkit to build security protocols which interoper-
ate despite the details differing by brand and by country. In the UK and Canada,
the system is known as “Chip and PIN” because most point-of-sale transactions
are authenticated with a PIN; Singapore continued to use signatures to authen-
ticate customers; and the USA will be somewhat similar to Singapore.
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An EMV transaction consists of three stages. The first is card authentication
where a chip in the card proves to the terminal that it is authentic. Next, card-
holder verification involves the customer either entering a PIN or signing for the
transaction. Finally, in transaction authorization, the card produces one or more
message authentication codes; as these use a key shared between the card and
the issuing bank, they can only be verified if the terminal is online.
The EMV protocol has numerous vulnerabilities, some of which are the in-
evitable result of implementation choices. For example, banks can issue expensive
cards that use public-key cryptography in the card authentication step, or cheap
ones that merely present a certificate, signed by the issuing bank, on the card
data; cards using this static data authentication option are easy to clone [4].
Other vulnerabilities were errors of design or implementation.
Insider attacks and blunders: Visa admitted that criminals have used brute-
force attacks against the PIN-verification command of their hardware security
modules (HSMs) to discover customer PINs, bypassing PIN-retry limits [21].
API attacks on HSMs have been known for a decade [8], and can also be used to
steal the keys needed to forge cards. Call-centre operators can send PIN-readvice
letters to an address controlled by an accomplice [17]; and many other bank em-
ployees have been prosecuted for abusing their access to commit fraud in various
ways [1]. Blunders also happen; in one case, two identical cards were sent to a
customer – a ‘this should never happen’ failure in the process of personalization.
PIN verification flaws: Where the customer PIN is verified by the card offline
– the default in most countries for merchant terminals – a fraudster can often
use a stolen card without knowing the PIN by inserting electronics between the
card and the terminal that tells the terminal the PIN verified correctly, but tells
the card that the transaction was authorised by signature [19]. Despite fraud
losses since 2010 [20] and publicity since 2011, only a few banks cross-check the
card and merchant records carefully enough to detect this ‘No-PIN’ attack.
Pre-play attack: In an EMV transaction, the terminal sends the card the
transaction amount, the date, and a random challenge; these are authenticated
by the card. However many terminals do not generate proper random numbers;
some use a counter instead. So an attacker with a payment terminal can get an
authentication code that will be accepted by a different terminal at some future
date [7]. The communications from a terminal to a bank can also be manipulated
to achieve the same effect: the attacker can insert a prerecorded nonce and
authentication code to make a transaction work. So a correct authentication
code does not automatically imply that the card was used in that terminal.
Misreporting by terminal: We have seen cases where the issuer’s logs stated
that a transaction was PIN-authenticated but the receipt showed it was signature-
authenticated [12]. Merchants have an incentive to lie to their bank, as PIN
transactions attract lower fees and are less likely to be charged back. In this case
the issuer relied upon the (unauthenticated) merchant-reported value rather then
the (authenticated) card-reported value, and denied the customer a refund.
Transaction reversal: The EMV transaction that authenticates a payment
is separate from the later settlement transaction where the merchant actually
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gets paid. A UK gang noticed that while cardholders were authenticated to the
bank, merchants were not. They would buy expensive goods from a merchant,
then impersonate that merchant to the bank to do a transaction reversal, and
spend the same money all over again. At trial, bank experts’ and defence experts’
estimates of the losses gang’s takings differed by many millions of pounds, and
the jury failed to agree.
Where it is clear which type of fraud has occurred, the card scheme rules will
specify who must pay the costs. The hard cases are where it is not clear whether
the correct PIN and card were used, and merchants or customers disagree with
the banks’ view of what happened. Many of the above cases led to fierce disputes
– which is why they came to attention.
3 Designing for evidence
The above cases show that the evidence produced by EMV transactions is just
not adequate for discriminating between attacks, and can lead to unfair treat-
ment of both cardholders and merchants. Banks for their part fear that due to
the lack of confidence that can be placed on the evidence, they may be forced
to refund customers who are actually making fraudulent claims of fraud. It is
in the interests of all honest parties to design a protocol that produces robust
evidence. In this section, we will explore what principles might help.
First, evidence must be usable. In the case of Job v Halifax [13], the bank was
unwilling to disclose the card’s authentication keys because they were derived
from a batch key, and other cards using keys derived from this were still in issue.
In addition, key management procedures were considered commercially sensitive.
So an outside expert witness could not have verified the authentication codes in
the logs. This brings us to our first principle:
Principle 1: Retention and disclosure. Protocols designed for evidence
should allow all protocol data and the keys needed to authenticate them to
be publicly disclosed, together with full documentation and a chain of custody.
It follows that nothing in the calculations needed to check a protocol run
should depend on any security sensitive, commercially confidential, or personal
information. The processes used to generate, issue, use, store and recover both
keys and data must be open to inspection by hostile litigants.
Second, evidence mechanisms must be tested end-to-end. Many cryptography
papers have statements like ‘so the judge raises Alice’s signature s to the power
e, finds it’s equal to h(m), and sends Bob to jail.’ This is sadly unrealistic. Each
party in legal proceedings presents their own evidence, and they can challenge the
evidence presented by the other party. For example, the digital tachographs now
used to monitor drivers’ hours in Europe are designed to produce authenticated
logs with digital signatures, but these are not yet used [2]. A vehicle inspector
who stops a truck suspected of a violation simply uses the traditional procedure
of printing out two separate copies of the log from the vehicle unit and sealing
them in evidence bags. The cryptography although present is disregarded. This
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should have been expected: system functionality that isn’t tested thoroughly
before deployment isn’t likely to work well, especially if the main stakeholders
and their vendors don’t think it matters. Our second principle is therefore
Principle 2: Test and debug evidential functionality. When a protocol is
designed for use in evidence, the designers should also specify, test and debug the
procedures to be followed by police officers, defence lawyers and expert witnesses.
With digital tachograph records, police officers had to improvise, and contin-
ued using ancient techniques, as did the organisations that received EMV fraud
reports. This led to front-line dispute resolution being left to bank call centres
and second-line resolution to bodies such as the Financial Ombudsman Service
that do not have the technical expertise to challenge bank logs. The easiest way
to deal with disputes was to fob off customers who were not particularly prof-
itable, or perhaps who were not rich enough to fight the bank in court. In the
tachograph case, the failure might be described perhaps as a missed business
opportunity; in the bank case as a failure of regulation.
Third comes complexity. Systems incorporating a security protocol are usu-
ally much more complex than the protocol itself. For example, card payment
systems incorporate EMV but also include backwards compatibility with legacy
systems, data collection for marketing, interfaces with call centers, and settle-
ment services. Bugs in, or insider attacks through, these other systems can lead
to inaccurate logs – as in the fraudulent reversal case above. Systems that are
complex and poorly documented are also more liable to have exploitable bugs –
complexity was at fault for the No-PIN attack. Our third principle is therefore
Principle 3: Open description of TCB. Systems designed to produce evi-
dence must have an open specification, including a concept of operations, a threat
model, a security policy, a reference implementation and protection profiles for
the evaluation of other implementations.
Another example comes from curfew tags, which are used in many countries
to track offenders released early from prison, or given a community sentence
instead of prison. The tag is typically a tamper-evident ankle bracelet that alarms
if the offender tried to pull it off, or goes out of range of a base station at his home
between 7pm and 7am. However one UK operator kept logs only at a back-end
system that was notoriously buggy, and was thus unable to distinguish between
tamper events and false alarms due to software bugs. As a result, tampering
prosecutions that were subject to technical challenge had to be dropped [3]. The
curfew enforcement contract has now gone to a different firm. A much better
design would have been to get the base station to create and sign log entries
for storage on the back-end server. The base station contains tamper-resistant
cryptography in any case, and using this to sign the log would have removed the
server software from the trusted computing base (TCB). A useful precedent may
be the Google NFC wallet, where logs are generated in the secure element in
the NFC chip and stored on Google’s servers, thus removing both the Android
handset and the merchant terminal from the TCB.
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So if designing a system that is too complex or sensitive for a full open
specification to be feasible, such as a smartphone incorporating a mobile wal-
let payment system, the prudent engineer will design the payment part of the
system so that it has open mechanisms and independent logging, with a clear
specification of the APIs or other interfaces by means of which an attacker might
have fed malicious instructions to it. That way, expert witnesses can investigate
how the overall system might have been tampered with.
Our fourth point is related, and concerns the effects of failure. In practice,
the evidence for a disputed EMV transaction is simply a record that an EMV
transaction happened. At best, there may be enough information in the logs to
repeat the security checks; but if a fraud was carried out successfully, the at-
tacker must have seen to it that the checks passed. This applies even to cards
implementing the most secure EMV variant, Combined DDA/Application Cryp-
togram Generation (CDA), where the card signs a hash of the transaction. The
transaction should only work if the CDA signature verifies – but, perversely,
neither the signature nor the data needed to verify it are sent back to the bank.
This is quite the wrong way round. Compare what happens with an old-
fashioned manuscript signature: frauds are easier to commit than with a PIN,
but are also easier to investigate because criminals are likely to produce a signa-
ture which forensic inspection will reveal as a forgery. Similarly, banknotes are
designed to support three levels of checking – by the public, by bank tellers and
by central-bank examiners. The public know a few of the security features, the
tellers a few more, while only the banknote issuer knows all of them.
It would therefore be beneficial if the system used for dispute resolution
could make extra checks. Fraudsters would have to bypass the normal checks,
but would have less incentive or opportunity to circumvent the secondary ones.
Our fourth principle is therefore
Principle 4: Failure-evidentness. Transaction systems designed to produce
evidence must be failure-evident. Thus they must not be designed so that any
defeat of the system entails the defeat of the evidence mechanism.
This is a more subtle property than the classic case of a fail-stop system.
Failure-evidentness might in some cases require independent mechanisms so it
can detect a total system compromise, and these mechanisms might have to
be based on random sampling. For example, the UK has had successive waves
of ATM frauds that the banks initially believed were impossible, and tried to
blame on customers, until a large enough number of complaints from respectable
cardholders or merchants whose business was too valuable to alienate forced
managers to take a second look. The same happened with transaction reversal
frauds. In some overseas jurisdictions, ATM cameras are mandatory for other
reasons (in New York to deter mugging) and these ensure that fraud patterns
resulting from a new modus operandi cannot so easily be ignored. Regulators
might consider requiring 5% of the ATM fleet to be equipped with cameras. This
would reduce the incentive on middle managers to deny a problem for as long
as possible and hope it will go away.
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Finally, there is a governance issue. Even if digital evidence starts off being
retained, open, tested and forensically efficacious, it is not trivial to ensure that it
will remain so as the system evolves, or that failures will be fixed. Initial forensic
procedures can be specified by the system designer, but if he retains control he
may resist admitting that anything was overlooked. He may have long-term
supply contracts with banks worth many millions and be very anxious to not
increase his manufacturing costs. Banks similarly may be anxious not to shake
confidence in the system, for fear of encouraging fraudulent claims of fraud. Our
fifth suggested principle is therefore aimed at regulators.
Principle 5: Governance of forensic procedures. The forensic procedures
for investigating disputed payments must be repeatable and be reviewed regu-
larly by independent experts appointed by the regulator. They must have access
to all security breach notifications and vulnerability disclosures.
This is a political hot potato in Europe at the moment. Security engineers
and NGOs have pushed for breach-disclosure laws, while the European Com-
mission has proposed a Network and Information Security directive that will
compel all Member States to legislate for both breaches and vulnerabilities to
be reported to a single government agency in each country. It is unclear that
the designated agency is likely to have financial consumer protection as its first
priority. Nonetheless, regulators must do what they can.
4 Other systems
The above principles can be illustrated by considering three different payment
systems: phone banking apps, the overlay banking service Sofortüberweisung,
and the cryptographic payment scheme Bitcoin.
4.1 Phone banking apps
Bank customers are increasingly making payments using phone banking apps.
The security of these apps varies across platforms and suppliers, but the diversity
of Android platforms has so far prevented significant use of protection mecha-
nisms such as TrustZone [5], while mobile network operators have opposed the
widespread use of secure elements in phone handsets themselves, instead promot-
ing the SIMs they themselves control. As a result, apps provided by the handset
vendors (such as the Google mobile wallet) are more or less limited to low-value
payments, while high-value account payments are made using proprietary apps
that run in user mode. In consequence, the vendors of banking trojan software
like Zeus are starting to make versions available that target phone banking.
The typical phone banking app complies with none of our principles. First,
the protocols and the embedded crypto are proprietary and may be covered by
an NDA between the software vendor and the bank; the disclosure of technical
details in one trial might expose vulnerabilities that could be exploited against
other banks who bought banking apps from the same vendor. Next, we have
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seen no case of an open design or reference implementation, let alone support for
dispute resolution or transparency to the regulator. The obscurity extends from
the software design to the nature of the logs kept by the bank, or by the system
house that operates its servers. And finally there is no reason to believe that such
a system will be failure evident. A malware attack on the bank’s customers that
steals authentication keys, or simply modifies the app’s user interface to make
payments to the gang using the mechanisms described in Aurasium [22], could
be catastrophic, and detected only when a mob of angry customers complain.
4.2 Sofortüberweisung
A payment service in Germany, Sofortüberweisung means ‘instant payment’.
This offers an service whereby a customer can make a payment to an online
merchant using a Giro transfer from his bank account. A participating website
might offer a shopper an option of a card payment with a fee or a Sofort payment
with no charge. If she clicks on Sofort, it solicits her bank name and account
number, then tries to log on to her bank account and asks for her password and
authentication code when the bank demands it. It checks that funds are available
and sends them to the merchant. In effect it does a man-in-the middle attack on
the German banking system, and now has 3% of the online payment market.
For the merchant, it’s cheaper than a card payment (the fee is .75% plus
10 cents versus 2.5% for a card); for the customer, it’s more convenient than
doing a Giro payment, as the interface is better, and the payment is tied to
the merchant transaction automatically; but for the banks it’s a nightmare. A
third party is not only costing them money by arbitraging their services, but
accumulating customer credentials and thus undermining their security. The
German banks sued Sofort for inducing their customers to break their terms
and conditions by disclosing passwords, but the case failed when the Federal
competition authorities intervened and told the court that competition with the
payment card cartel was welcome. Sofort now has a banking license.
The implications for our robustness principles are as follows. Principle 1,
openness, is reinforced for all; bank attempts to make authentication processes
obscure to thwart Sofort have failed. Principles 2 and 3 are disregarded by all
players equally except insofar as openness is increased. Principle 4, of failure-
evidentness, is seriously undermined. If a customer disputes a transaction with
a bank, and has previously used Sofort for any transaction at all, then it’s not
obvious who is at fault, and in theory the bank could rely on its terms and
conditions to void the customer guarantee. Principles 5 and 6 are essentially un-
affected, although Sofort’s very existence may in time drive regulators to acquire
more technical nous.
4.3 Bitcoin
Bitcoin is a digital currency, or perhaps more correctly a digital resource de-
signed to be scarce and electronically tradeable, in which coins are mined by
principals who solve cryptographic puzzles (‘miners’) and can be transferred to
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other principals using digital signatures. Bitcoin miners find special hashes of
all transactions seen to date, thereby guaranteeing consensus on the transaction
history or ‘blockchain’ (unless a majority of miners were to start working on
a different transaction history). Bitcoins are converted to and from real money
by brokers, of which one firm (Mt. Gox) has most of the business. Principals
are known only by one or more public signature verification keys, so anonymous
transactions are possible (though coins can be traced through transactions, al-
lowing traffic analysis of the Bitcoin economy [16]). Bitcoins have been used for
both lawful and unlawful purposes, the latter including the ‘Silk Road’ auction
market for illegal drugs and firearms, which was recently shut down by the FBI.
Had the authorities not managed to identify the individuals behind Silk Road,
legal coercion might conceivably have been used to shut Bitcoin down or bring
it under regulatory control. There are several options. First, as pointed out by
Böhme [18], law enforcement could have compelled the major brokers such as
Mt. Gox to blacklist bitcoins that had been used on illegal markets such as
Silk Road, thereby undermining Bitcoin’s fungibility and causing loss of trust.
A second possibility would be to coerce the Bitcoin developer community; this
has been done in the Lavabit case, where a webmail provider shut his service
rather than yield to an FBI demand that he hand over the service’s SSL keys. A
third possibility would be to coerce the miners: at present two mining companies
produce over 50% of bitcoins, so could in theory tamper with the blockchain by,
for example, not recognising a transaction made by a criminal suspect. A fourth
would be for a government agency to acquire the computing power to produce
over 50% of the mining activity and thus take over the blockchain directly.
From individual bitcoin holders’ point of view, the main problem is that
there is no issuing authority and thus no-one to turn to in the event that their
bitcoins get stolen (or that they simply forget the password to their Bitcoin
wallet, rendering their bitcoins unspendable). Thus Bitcoin fails to meet the
consumer-protection provisions of the EU Payment Services Directive.
Bitcoin easily satisfies principle 1 (open data and checkability of authen-
tication) and arguably 3 (open spec and implementation). It fails principles 2
(forensic and dispute procedures) and 5 (governance) because there is no dispute
resolution mechanism. Principle 4 is also violated because a defeat of Bitcoin (for
example, by legal coercion of the software) would be a catastrophic failure.
An interesting protocol design problem is if a court is contemplating ordering
a break of Bitcoin – e.g. by coercing software developers, brokers, or miners –
then is it feasible to move to a Bitcoin 2.0 that allowed selective transaction
blacklisting in a robust way? Blacklisting all transactions with coins that were
once used in Silk Road, for example, would lead to gross overblocking. Or is the
only feasible outcome the total destruction of the Bitcoin ecosystem?
5 Improvements to EMV
It can be very hard to implement changes to any widely deployed protocol if
that involves changing a lot of systems simultaneously. For example, the many
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bugs discovered in SSL/TLS over the past decade have mostly been fixed with
server-side hacks, as it is simply too hard to change all the world’s web servers
and browsers at once. The same applies in spades to EMV, with 30,000 banks,
millions of merchants, and over a billion cards in issue. We can therefore only
consider changes that can be introduced piecemeal with changes to either cards
or back-end systems.
Following principle 3, we propose performing the additional checks primar-
ily on the card, because cards are far simpler than the back-end, are tamper
resistant, and are in some sense under control of the customer. Therefore more
information about their functionality can be disclosed and there are fewer op-
portunities for malicious modification.
5.1 Transaction counters
EMV cards maintain one or more counters that are incremented at the start of
every transaction. This can already be quite useful for detecting cloned cards, be-
cause if a genuine card and its clone are used concurrently there will be sequence
overlaps in attempted transactions.
The use of the transaction counter as an investigation tool does not require
any changes to the card, but does require the development of procedures to
extract it from the banks’ logs and also from the legitimate card. Above all we
need a regulatory change. For example, banks instruct their customers to cut
up the card at once if there is a dispute, which is contrary to the customer’s
interest.
5.2 Transaction log
Optionally EMV cards can maintain a log of recent transactions. If the card is
still in the customer’s possession then the presence or absence of the disputed
transaction in the card log is convincing evidence as to whether the legitimate
card was used. However the transaction log is not commonly enabled, and there
is a privacy impact of enabling the log as any merchant could then read it.
As with the transaction counter, no changes are needed to cards (other than
enabling the feature) but there would need to be procedures developed for ex-
tracting and evaluating the results. Perhaps, with a bit more effort, a bank could
arrange things so that its customers could read their card logs at its ATMs but
still protect their privacy from merchants.
5.3 Forensics mode
An issue with the transaction counter and the transaction log is that gaining
access to them requires initiating a transaction and therefore increasing the
counter. For repeatability, it would be better if a card could be placed into
a forensics mode where it is no longer able to carry out transactions but will
disclose the transaction counter. The card could also unlock the transaction log
so that it could be read, and allow access to internal risk analysis counters which
could be correlated with bank logs.
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5.4 Cryptographic audit log
A weakness of all of the above approaches is that they still depend on the bank’s
logs for reliability and so do not meet the criterion of complete system disclosure.
Past experience sadly suggests that banks in some countries will drag their feet
over retaining logs and making them available; and that the regulators in these
countries will be reluctant to force them. (The two properties are of course
related.) So how can a bank in a well-regulated country protect its cardholders
when they travel and transact in a poorly-regulated one? A forward secure audit
log implemented by the card can provide a lot of protection while storing log
records on the card issuer’s server to avoid limitations on bank card memory.
The card would be initialized not just with a key used for authentication
codes, but with an audit key that is also unique to each card (even if this card
replaces a card which seemed to fail personalisation). The audit key is updated
on each new transaction and a forward-secure MAC [6] is computed on the trans-
action (including the result of PIN verification). Even compromising the card’s
current audit key will not then be enough to produce fake log messages from the
past. This construction also means that audit keys can always be produced in
court to resolve disputes.
We want to prevent a forger working forwards as well as backwards, so that
even if a card’s original audit key is later compromised, the attacker still cannot
go back and invent an entirely fake transaction history. So the bank should create
a hash-chain over all online transactions, with the root being the audit key [14],
and commit the audit records by including them in the customer’s statement.
Once put into forensics mode, the card would provide access to the final entry
of the hash-chain. Then even with access to the original audit key, a criminal
would not be able to insert a fake transaction without creating an inconsistency
between the bank’s log and the legitimate card’s log.
6 Open questions
The adoption of the above proposals would substantially improve the quality
of evidence which could be presented in EMV disputes. However, it would not
resolve all cases. When there is no dispute that the correct card and PIN was
used, liability depends on whether the PIN was discovered through customer
negligence. Fraudulent requests for PIN-readvice letters or brute force attacks
against bank HSMs cannot be stopped by changes to card software, but will
require changes to back-end systems and operational procedures.
The relay attack [9] also poses a problem because a cryptographic audit log
would only prove whether a card processed the transaction which was authenti-
cated, not that the customer saw the transaction. Here too, operational changes
can help: in Singapore, transactions are reported to the account holder by SMS,
so any relay attacks should be rapidly detected. An alternative technology is a
smartphone payment mechanism which can give a more trustworthy display.
ATM transactions are typically performed using online PIN verification and
so the card is not able to know whether the PIN was verified correctly. This could
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be resolved by the ATM sending the PIN to the card for offline PIN verification in
addition to the usual online PIN verification. This approach will produce a more
valuable audit log as well as defeating attacks which rely on desynchronizing the
version of the PIN on the card and the version on the issuer’s back-end system.
7 Conclusions
We proposed five principles to guide designers of payment mechanisms and other
systems that may have to be relied on to provide evidence.
We analysed a number of systems. Mobile phone banking apps are partic-
ularly bad as they typically abide by none of these; this may portend trouble
for the industry, as the tagging systems used to monitor curfewees’ parole also
ignore the above principles, and have failed to stand up in court, with significant
commercial consequences. Overlay payment systems such as Sofortüberweisung
are less bad but still fall short; such systems may need carefully-designed logging
systems to deal with frauds and disputes in the future. Bitcoin does not support
any form of dispute resolution at all, and given that it is vulnerable to at least
three forms of attack based on legal coercion and one based on brute-force, it
may well be more fragile than most of its users realise. Our principles can also
be used to expose and highlight design deficiencies in other monitoring systems,
such as curfew tags and tachographs.
Our most detailed study was of EMV, ‘Chip and PIN’, the dominant card
payment mechanism, which is used in Europe and Asia, and is now being de-
ployed in the USA. This turns out to have a number of significant shortcomings.
We argue that they can be mitigated by individual card-issuing banks, indepen-
dent of any changes to the EMV protocol suite itself, by making transaction
counters more accessible to forensic examination; by having logs of recent trans-
actions on the card; and having key material on the card with which logs are
authenticated, and which can be released to forensic examiners without compro-
mising the security of the payment mechanism itself. These technical measures
have to be complemented by changes in procedure – most notably telling cus-
tomers to retain cards in transaction disputes rather than destroy them; and
almost certainly by regulatory action too, which will ultimately be succesful
only if card-issuing banks are less able than at present to externalise their fraud
liability to their customers.
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